Suchergebnisse

Rechtsverstöße sind im Kapitalmarktrecht mittlerweile regelmäßig unter namentlicher Nennung des Rechtsverletzers zu veröffentlichen. Während man darin international häufig einen geschätzten Sanktionsmechanismus sieht, begegnet man diesem Instrument in Deutschland äußerst kritisch und versteht es überwiegend dezidiert nicht als repressive Sanktion, sondern als rein präventive Maßnahme.Der Verfasser unternimmt den Nachweis, dass diese Veröffentlichungen entgegen der bislang vorherrschenden Ansicht repressiver Natur sind. Dazu systematisiert er die einschlägigen Normen und begründet, weshalb die Einordnung anhand der jeweiligen Veröffentlichungszwecke zu erfolgen hat und für die Rechtsanwendung bedeutsam ist. Nach einer Erläuterung des Spektrums denkbarer Ziele und einem Exkurs zur kartellrechtlichen Veröffentlichung von Verstößen widmet der Verfasser sich ausführlich den einzelnen Normen. Abschließend ordnet er das Rechtsinstitut rechtsökonomisch und rechtspolitisch ein.

Abstract
Accusations of bad state behaviour in cyberspace are proliferating, yet this increase in naming has not obviously produced much shame. Accused states uniformly deny the accusation or decline to comment, without changing behaviour. For international lawyers, the problem is compounded by the absence of international law in these charges. States are not invoking international law when they complain of other states' behaviour, suggesting the law is weak – or worse, irrelevant – in holding states accountable for their cyber operations. In lieu of 'naming and shaming', we introduce and examine the broader concept of 'accusation' as a social, political and legal practice with diverse uses in cyberspace and beyond. Accusers must make strategic choices about how they frame their accusations, and we unpack various elements accusers may manipulate to their advantage. Accusations also have many purposes. They may seek to 'name and shame' an accused into conforming to certain behavioural expectations, but they may also aim at defensive or deterrent effects on both the accused and, crucially, on third parties. Particularly important, accusations may play a constitutive role, constructing new norms, including customary international law, within the international community. In short, accusations offer states and other stakeholders a menu of strategic options beyond those identified by the extant literature on naming and shaming.

In the current international system, the use of centralized, hard enforcement mechanisms is often deemed either politically impossible or too costly. As a consequence, many international organizations (IOs) rely on so-called naming and shaming strategies as tools of political influence. Naming and shaming is the public exposure and condemnation of states that violate international rules and norms. It is not designed to simply renegade violators, but to produce compliance through reputational and status concerns. But how does naming and shaming work and what impact does it have on state behavior? In this dissertation, I adopt a comprehensive approach to the study of naming and shaming by examining its underlying politics and determinants as well as its impact on state behavior. In search for answers, I focus on the naming and shaming strategies employed in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the period 1989-2011. Drawing on the theories of international politics, I develop a set of hypotheses that are tested by means of statistical as well as process tracing techniques. The overall conclusions of the dissertation are fourfold. First, the results indicate that ILO naming and shaming is used to punish violators of international labor standards. This implies that IOs, under the right conditions, can thwart the politicization of naming and shaming that has been observed in other IOs. Second, I find support for my argument that the decision to engage in naming and shaming primarily is determined by the democratic character of states. This enhances our understanding of when states participate in pressuring targets and the patterns of inter-state shaming. Third, the dissertation finds that ILO naming and shaming can improve international labor standards. The impact of ILO naming and shaming is stronger when target states are democratic and resourceful. This implies that IOs can overcome international collective problems without hard enforcement mechanisms and that IO naming and shaming, under certain propitious conditions, can produce compliance. Fourth, while democracies are more likely to respond to international criticism, not all democracies do. This dissertation demonstrates that ILO naming and shaming is a powerful tool among democracies that have strong and united labor unions. This implies that IO naming and shaming of democratic states is likely to work through domestic pressure mechanisms. ; At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Submitted. Paper 3: Submitted. Paper 4: Manuscript.